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We present SCADE and Lustre models of the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA), which is
one of the first cryptographic functions for computing a message authentication code. The MAA
was adopted between 1987 and 2001, in international standards (ISO 8730 and ISO 8731-2), to
ensure the authenticity and integrity of banking transactions. This paper discusses the choices and
the challenges of our MAA implementations. Our SCADE and Lustre models validate 201 official
test vectors for the MAA.
1 Introduction
One of the first Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms to gain widespread acceptance was the
Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA, also known as the Message Authentication Algorithm) [5, 6,
21] designed in 1983 by Donald Davies and David Clayden. The MAA was adopted by ISO in 1987
and became part of the international standards 8730 [10] and 8731-2 [11]. Later, cryptanalysis of the
MAA revealed various weaknesses, including feasible brute-force attacks, existence of collision clusters,
and key-recovery techniques [22, 26, 24, 23, 21]. For this reason, the MAA was withdrawn from ISO
standards in 2002. Even if the MAA was deprecated, as it happens to every cryptographic protocol as
time passes, various formal specifications of the MAA have been developed before and after 2002. Most
likely because the MAA wqs the first message authentication code algorithm and its definition is stable
and will not change anymore. Moreover, it was designed as a standalone algorithm that does not rely
on any preexisting hash function or cipher and, hence, has manageable complexity. The existing formal
specifications of the MAA are either non-executable, such as the VDM one in 1990 [19, 20], the Z one in
1991 [15], the LOTOS one in 1990/1991 [18, 17] or executable, such as the LOTOS one ([8]), the LNT
one ([8]), and those automatically derived from a term rewrite system ([7]). More details about these
earlier formal specifications of the MAA are available in [8]. Thus, the MAA could be viewed as a sort
of Rosetta stone1 for formal methods. However, synchronous models of the MAA have been missing so
far, and this is what the present article is about.
This paper brings MAA models in synchronous languages to enrich the collection of formal models
for the MAA algorithm. More precisely, in this paper, we present a formal model of the MAA with
the synchronous formal language Lustre [9] dedicated to design embedded control systems; and with
the industrial formal language SCADE (Safety Critical Application Development Environment) [4]. We
discuss implementation choices and challenges, common to both models, partly because the SCADE
language is based on Lustre language. Finally, we explain how we test the two formal models with
the complete set of test vectors derived from the initial specification [6]. The remainder of the paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the technical perspective of the MAA. The modeling of
the MAA using the synchronous language SCADE/Lustre is described in Section 3. Section 4 precises
1The Rosetta Code repository (http://www.rosettacode.org/wiki/Rosetta_Code) collects classical algorithm im-
plementations, written in hundreds different programming languages.
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how the SCADE and the Lustre models have been validated. Finally, Section 5 gives some concluding
remarks and future work directions.
2 The MAA Algorithm
In data security, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a short sequence of bits that is computed
from a given message; a MAC ensures both the authenticity and integrity of the message, i.e., that
the message sender is the stated one and that the message contents have not been altered. The design of
MAC usually involves cryptographic keys shared between the message sender and receiver, which makes
it more secure under attacks. In this section, we briefly explain the principles of the MAA while more
detailed explanations are provided in [5, 6] and [16, Algorithm 9.68].
The MAA was intended to be implemented in software and to run on 32-bit computers. Hence, its
design intensively relies on 32-bit words (called blocks) and 32-bit machine operations. The MAA takes
as inputs a key and a message. The key has 64 bits and is split into two blocks J and K. The message is
seen as a sequence of blocks. If the number of bytes of the message is not a multiple of four, extra null
bytes are added at the end of the message to complete the last block. The size of the message should
be less than 1,000,000 blocks; otherwise, the MAA result is said to be undefined; we believe that this
restriction, which is not inherent to the algorithm itself, was added in the second ISO standard [13] to
provide MAA implementations with an upper bound (four megabytes) on the size of memory buffers
used to store messages.
The MAA produces as output a block, which is the MAC value computed from the key and the
message. The fact that this result has only 32 bits proved to be a major weakness enabling cryptographic
attacks; MAC values computed by modern algorithms now have a much larger number of bits. Apart
from the aforementioned restriction on the size of messages, the MAA behaves as a totally-defined
function; its result is deterministic in the sense that, given a key and a message, there is only a single
MAC result, which neither depends on implementation choices nor on hidden inputs, such as randomly-
generated numbers.
The MAA calculations rely upon conventional 32-bit logical and arithmetic operations, among
which: AND (conjunction), OR (disjunction), XOR (exclusive disjunction), CYC (circular rotation by
one bit to the left), ADD (addition), CAR (carry bit generated by 32-bit addition), MUL (multiplication,
sometimes decomposed into HIGH MUL and LOW MUL, which denote the most- and least-significant
blocks in the 64-bit product of a 32-bit multiplication). On this basis, more involved operations are de-
fined, among which MUL1 (result of a 32-bit multiplication modulo 232−1), MUL2 (result of a 32-bit
multiplication modulo 232−2), MUL2A (faster version of MUL2), FIX1 and FIX2 (two unary functions2
respectively defined as x→ AND(OR(x,A),C) and x→ AND(OR(x,B),D), where A, B, C, and D are the
four hexadecimal block constants A = 02040801, B = 00804021, C = BFEF7FDF, and D = 7DFEFBFF).
The MAA operates in three successive phases:
• The PRELUDE takes the two blocks J and K of the key and converts them into six blocks X0, Y0,
V0, W , S, and T . This phase is executed once. After the prelude, J and K are no longer used.
• The MAIN LOOP successively iterates on each block Mn of the message (M1, ..., Mn). This
phase maintains three variables X , Y , and V (initialized to X0, Y0, and V0, respectively), which are
modified at each iteration. The main loop also uses the value of W , but does not use S and T .
2The names FIX1 and FIX2 appeared in [18, pages 36 and 77].
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Figure 1: Mode of operation of the MAA
• The CODA adds the blocks S and T at the end of the message and performs two more iterations
on these blocks. After the last iteration, the MAA result is XOR(X , Y ), called Z.
In 1987, the second ISO standard [11, Section 5] introduced an additional feature (called mode of
operation), which concerns messages longer than 256 blocks, which was not present in the early MAA
versions designed at NPL. Figure 1 gives an overview of “the mode of operation”. Each message longer
than 256 blocks must be split into segments of 256 blocks each, with the last segment possibly containing
less than 256 blocks. The above MAA algorithm (prelude, main loop, and coda) is applied to the first
segment, resulting in a value noted Z1. This block Z1 is then inserted before the first block of the second
segment, leading to a 257-block message to which the MAA algorithm is applied, resulting in a value
noted Z2. This is done repeatedly for all the n segments, the MAA result Zi computed for the i-th segment
being inserted before the first block of the (i+1)-th segment. Finally, the MAC for the entire message is
the MAA result Zn computed for the last segment.
3 Modelling MAA in SCADE and Lustre
We consider the MAA models LNT-18 [8] and REC-17 [7] and extend them to model the full MAA
algorithm in the synchronous languages Lustre [9] and SCADE [2]. Lustre is a synchronous language
based on the dataflow model of computation, which defines a reactive system that receives inputs at each
tick of a logical clock and calculates outputs. The relation between inputs and outputs is described using
a system of (unordered) equations. At a given cycle, the value of inputs can be memorized to be reused
in the next cycles. The outputs at a given instant may thus depend on current and past inputs, but not on
future inputs. The relations between inputs and outputs are specified in nodes using constants, operators,
functions, auxiliary variables, as well as other nodes, which provide for a compositional description
of complex systems. SCADE is an industrial language that merges two different academic languages:
Lustre, a declarative dataflow language, and Esterel [3] an imperative, synchronous process calculus;
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more precisely, SCADE embodies a graphical variant of Esterel known as SyncCharts [1]. Although
these languages are quite different, the designers of SCADE managed to integrate both in one coherent
language. In the present article, our modelling is based upon the dataflow subset of SCADE, with little
or no use of the Esteral/SynchCharts features.
Also, following the approach of a previous modelling of the MAA using term rewrite systems ([7]),
we chose not to rely on predefined data types of SCADE (bits, machine words, etc.) but to define all
our types from scratch, using the type constructors provided by the language. One advantage of this
approach is that it is fully formal, without implicit assumptions about the implementation of machine
words or the behaviour of predefined arithmetic operations. This also provides a thorough exercise to
assess the correctness and performance of Lustre and SCADE compilers.
A large part of our SCADE/Lustre models contain generic definitions independent of the MAA that
could be reused to model other examples. The whole SCADE model of the MAA is presented in both the
Appendix A and the MARS repository, while the Lustre model will only appear in the MARS repository,
as it is very similar to the SCADE one. As in [7], we choose to represent blocks as words of four bytes,
rather than thirty-two bits. Thereby, the logical operations on blocks (AND, OR, XOR, and CYC) are
easy to define using bitwise and bytewise manipulations. The bits, bytes and blocks are represented with
the three following SCADE data structures:
type Bit = enum {X0 ,X1};
type Octet = {x1: Bit; x2: Bit; x3: Bit; x4: Bit;
x5: Bit; x6: Bit; x7: Bit; x8: Bit};
type Block = {o1: Octet; o2: Octet;
o3: Octet; o4: Octet};
Next, we define a set of functions to implement the corresponding logical operations on bits, bytes, and
blocks. The arithmetical operations (ADD, CAR, and MUL) have been implemented using 8-bit, 16-bit,
and 32-bit adders and multipliers, more or less inspired from the theory of digital circuits. Thus, the
structure Pair shown below, represents the result of the multiplication of two blocks.
type Pair = {w1: Block; w2: Block};
A message is a list of blocks, each block of the message is an input of the main MAC node in SCADE,
as illustrated in Figure 4 (graphically) and in Figure 5 (in code). Note that in the synchronous dataflow
SCADE/Lustre, a node describes the relation between its input and output parameters using a system
of equations. A node is composed of a set of unordered equations that define each output parameter
according to the actual or previous input parameters.
The MAC node takes as input the message to encode, and a key, which corresponds to two words
(called K and J). A local variable init defines the beginning of a message, and another variable n
stores the number of blocks, in order to ensure the implementation of the “mode of operation” of the
MAA, i.e., segmentation of messages larger than 1024 bytes (as explained in Section 2). The MAC pro-
vides as outputs the result of the intermediate computations (prelude, mainloop) in the auxiliary blocks
(X, Y, V, W, S, T), and the result of its main computation, i.e., the MAC for the given input (one key
and a message), which is represented by a variable (Z). At each call of the SCADE node MAC, one new
block of the message is processed as follows:
• for the 1st block of the message, the auxiliary variables (X, Y, and V) are computed with an
iteration of the mainLoop function with the initial values (X0, Y0, V0) computed by the function
prelude shown in Figure 5;
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Figure 2: Graphical SCADE node: MAC without the “mode of operation”.
Figure 3: The count node
• for the 257th block of the message, the auxiliary variables are computed with an iteration of the
mainLoop2 function, which consists of two iterations of the mainLoop, one on the result of the
previous coda (Z), and one on this block message; and,
• for the other blocks of the message, the auxiliary variables are computed by taking into account
the previous auxiliary variables (pre X, pre Y, and pre V) computed by the previous block.
Figure 2 represents the graphical SCADE MAC A node without the implementation of the “mode of op-
eration” (segmentation of the 1024 bytes messages). User defined operators such as functions (prelude,
mainLoop, and coda) or nodes are represented by yellow boxes while native SCADE operators are rep-
resented in blue boxes. In particular, the two specific flow manipulation operators for nodes (inherited
from Lustre) are used in the MAC A node (See Figure 2):
• the memory operator pre (“previous”) refers to the value of an input or output variable at the
previous cycle;
• the initialization operator -> (“followed by”) initializes a stream.
In order to implement the “mode of operation”, we add a graphical node counting the number of blocks
(nr) of the segment, represented in Figure 3. The node size contains the graphical choice operator,
enabling the design of two branches. The first one resets the number of blocks (nr) for the 257th block of
the message (pre segment), while the second branch increases nr for the other blocks. Note that segment
is a constant corresponding to the maximum size of a message segment (256 blocks). The choice operator
and the size node are then used to design the two branches of the graphical MAC node implementing
the “mode of operation” represented in Figure 2. Note that one of the branches consist of the MAC A
node represented in Figure 2. We could use the modular reset feature of SCADE (restart) to reinitialize
the MAC node from the outside. It would have simplified the counter definition, and so the model, but
since Lustre does not provide this feature, we don’t use it for either of the models. Keys could also
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Figure 4: Graphical SCADE node: MAC with the “mode of operation”.
node MAC (KJ: Key; Mn: Block; init: bool)
returns (X, Y, V, W, S, T, Z: Block; n: int32)
var X0 , Y0 , V0: Block;
newSegment: bool;
let
n = 0 -> if init then 0 else ((pre n) + 1) mod 256;
newSegment = false -> if pre n = 255 then true else false;
−− i n i t i a l i s a t i o n s
X0, Y0, V0, W, S, T = prelude (KJ.J, KJ.K);
−− m a i n l o o p s
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, Mn) ->
if init then
mainLoop (X0, Y0, V0, W, Mn)
else if newSegment then
−− mode o f o p e r a t i o n s
mainLoop2 (X0, Y0, V0, W, pre Z, Mn)
else mainLoop (pre X, pre Y, pre V, W, Mn);
−− coda
Z = coda (X, Y, V, W, S, T);
tel;
Figure 5: Textual representation of the MAC node
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be represented using the type Pair, but we prefer introducing the following dedicated structure Key to
clearly distinguish between keys and other pairs (e.g., results of the multiplication of two blocks):
type Key = struct {K: Block; J: Block};
We define the “multiplicative” functions used for MAA computations, most of which are presented
in [6] or have been later introduced in [16]. The three principal low-level operations are MUL1, MUL2,
and MUL2A, with its auxiliary functions. We also define the higher-level functions that implement the
MAA algorithm on one segment (maximum 1024-byte), namely prelude, inner loop, coda, as well as the
principal function MAC (that computes the 4-byte signature of a message).
It turns out that SCADE/Lustre enables an elegant modeling of the involved data structures, such as
enumeration (e.g., the enumeration Bit) and structures (e.g., the type Byte defined as Octet). We briefly
discuss below some of our choices for modeling the MAA in SCADE/Lustre.
Usage of local variables. Local variables are essential to store computed results that need to be used
several times, thus avoiding identical calculations to be repeated. SCADE allows us to freely define
and assign local variables; the compiler guarantees that each variable is duly assigned before used.
However, SCADE forbids successive assignments to the same variable. For instance, the MUL2
function can be expressed in SCADE as follows:
function MUL2 (w1, w2 : Block) returns (w: Block)
var w1w2 , w3w4 , w5w6: Pair; w3: Block;
let
w1w2 = mulBlock (w1 , w2);
w3w4 = ADDC (w1w2.w1 , w1w2.w1);
w3 = addBlock (w3w4.w2 , addBlock (w3w4.w1 , w3w4.w1));
w5w6 = ADDC (w3 , w1w2.w2);
w = addBlock (w5w6.w2, addBlock (w5w6.w1, w5w6.w1));
tel;
Functions computing several results. There are several such functions in the MAA; let us consider the
prelude function which takes two block parameters J and K and returns six block parameters X,
Y, V, W, S, and T. By exploiting the fact that SCADE/Lustre functions may return one or several
parameters, we can elegantly define the prelude function in SCADE as follows:
function prelude (J, K: Block)
returns (X, Y, V, W, S, T: Block)
var P: Octet; H4 , H5 , H6 , H7 , H8 , H9: Block;
J1 , J14 , J16 , J18 , J24 , J26 , J28: Block;
K1 , K15 , K17 , K25 , K27 , K19 , K29: Block;
let
J1, K1 = BYT (J, K);
P = PAT (J, K);
_,J14 , J16 , J18 ,_,J24 , J26 , J28 = preludeJ (J1);
_,_,K15 , K17 , K19 ,_,_,K25 , K27 , K29 = preludeK (K1);
H4, H6, H8 = preludeHJ (J14 ,J16 ,J18 ,J24 ,J26 ,J28);
_,H5, H7, H9 = preludeHK (K15 ,K17 ,K19 ,K25 ,K27 ,K29 ,P);
X, Y = BYT (H4, H5);
V, W = BYT (H6, H7);
S, T = BYT (H8, H9);
tel;
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The definitions of the auxiliary functions preludeJ, preludeK, preludeHJ, and preludeHK are in
Appendix M. This function is invoked as follows (as it is done in the MAC node):
X, Y, V, W, S, T = prelude (J, K);
Note that in SCADE the underscore symbol (_) is used in place of defining a local variable if the
corresponding returned value is not used. In our case, we needed some outputs from the auxiliary
functions for the test vectors, but not for the prelude function, which is why we ’assigned them to
_’ in prelude.
Comparison between SCADE and Lustre implementations: In the semantic context of our MAA
formal models the differences between the two languages are negligible. First, SCADE uses comma
instead of a semicolon, and defines the type before the equal in the constant/function definitions. Second,
using let/tel in a function composed of one statement is not permitted in SCADE, which generally reduces
the number of code lines. However, the main difference is on the compilers: the SCADE compiler
enabled us to detect some potentially non-initialized variables in the MAC node and variables not used
in the prelude function. The Lustre and SCADE models contain 9 types (structures), 442 constants,
100 functions, and 1 nodes each. Our complete Lustre model of the MAA (see the repository) consists
of 1908 lines and our complete SCADE model of the MAA (see Appendix A) has 1762 lines and 3
additional graphical nodes.
Comparison between SCADE/Lustre and earlier implementations: Our two synchronous models
are executable, in a sense that they can be compiled automatically into some executable program that
will be run to generate the expected results. Let us review these two synchronous models with the three
earlier executable specifications; REC-17 [7], LOTOS-18 [8], and, LNT-18 [8].
• Rather than importing external fragments of code written in C, as in LOTOS-18 and LNT-17, to
implement for instance blocks and arithmetic operations on blocks, REC-17 and Lustre/SCADE
models implement the algorithm entirely, they are self-contained and fully-formal. Even if using
external fragments would allow a shorter formalization and generation of more efficient code. We
prefer to avoid the risks arising when formal and non-formal codes are mixed (e.g., an error was
found in the external implementation in C [8]).
• Contrary to REC 17, LNT-18 and LOTOS-18 specifications, the Lustre/SCADE models contains
duplicated computations. Effectively, the MAC node is defined as a sequential function; at each
instant, the MAC calculates prelude and coda, even if prelude is only needed at the beginning of
each message sequence, and the latter is only needed at the end. Such “trick” was necessary, since
modelling cryptographical protocol is not the usual application domain of Lustre/SCADE.
• SCADE and LNT-18 models have a more disciplined specification style than the three other ex-
ecutable specifications, because of the numerous static-analysis checks (e.g., unused variables,
useless assignments, etc.) performed by their compilers.
• Finally, the SCADE model contains graphical representations, which makes the model readable
and easier to use for non-specialists. To the best of our knowledge, this feature is absent in other
specification languages.
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4 Testing the MAA Model
To validate our SCADE and Lustre models, we define four sets of test vectors derived from the specifi-
cation in [6]. The four sets are defined as follows:
(T1) implements the 36 checks listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3 of [6]. These test vectors specify, for a few
given keys and messages, the expected values of intermediate calculations (e.g., MUL1, MUL2,
MUL2A, etc.).
(T2) is based upon Table 4 of [6], checking if the main loop of the MAA (as described on page 10 of [6])
is correctly implemented on six groups of checks (three single-block messages and one three-block
message); T2 corresponds to 56 tests.
(T3) is based upon Table 5 of [6], checking if the MAA signature is correctly computed on four groups
of checks, with two different keys and two different messages; T3 corresponds to 64 tests.
(T4) checks all intermediary values of the algorithm with a message of 20 blocks containing only zeros
directly taken from Table 6 of [6]; T4 corresponds to 45 tests.
We automate the test execution process, for the test vector (T3) presented in [6, Table 6], namely, four
groups of checks, with two different keys and two different messages. The test automation process is
different for Lustre and SCADE; we explain them in the following section.
4.1 Validation of the Lustre model
When automating the test execution process, we use the testing tool Lurette [14] and take advantage of its
connection with the Lustre language. Figure 6 gives an overview of Lurette in the context of testing our
Figure 6: Overview of the Lurette testing tool
MAA model. Lurette takes two inputs: (i) a specification of the environment constraints in Lutin [25] to
dynamically constrain the inputs, (ii) an oracle implementing the test decision, in our case the 12 possible
pairs (one key K J, and a message of two blocks), and the expected resulting MAC; and some parameters
controlling the execution and the coverage of the generated input sequences, e.g., the number of steps
(n) in the execution sequence. Lurette interacts with the Lustre implementation of the MAA, logs the
generated sequence of inputs and their corresponding outputs in a file, and displays the test decisions.
Following [7], we add three supplementary test vectors that operate on messages of 16, 256, and
4100 blocks containing bit patterns not preserved by permutations to detect implementation mistakes
arising from byte permutations (e.g., endianness issues) or incorrect segmentation of messages longer
than 1024 bytes (i.e., 256 blocks). Originally in [7], it was done by introducing a function acting as a
pseudo-random message generator, which is only possible to implement in Lustre with recursive nodes.
Thus, we rewrite the node MAC as the recursive Lustre MAC long messages node as below:
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node MAC_long_messages <<const it : int >> (INIT , INCR: Block;KJ: Key)
returns (mac: Block);
var X0 , Y0 , V0: Block;
X, Y, V, W, S, T, Z: Block;
Mn: Block; n: int; newSegment: bool;
let
−− pseudo−random m e s s a g e g e n e r a t i o n
Mn = INIT -> addBlock (pre Mn , INCR);
−− . . . i d e n t i c a l t o t h e MAC node
−− r e c u r s i v e c a l l on t h e n e x t b l o c k
mac = with (it = 1) then Z
else MAC_long_messages << it -1 >> (INIT , INCR , KJ);
tel;
When defining the recursive node in the code above, we specify the integer depth of recursion in trian-
gular brackets, the depth of the recursion. The MAC long messages has three inputs: the blocks INIT
and INCR to generates a message of the given length ( it ), the blocks of which follow an arithmetic
progression, and the key KJ.
The following Lustre node check long message implements the test vectors that operate on messages
of 16, 256, and 4100 blocks containing bit patterns not preserved by permutations:
node check_long_message () returns (v: bool);
var m20 , m16 , m256 , m4100: Block; KJ: Key;
let
KJ = Key {K = x80018000; J = x80018001 };
−− m e s s a g e s o f 1 6 , 2 5 6 , and 4100 b l o c k s
m16 = MAC_long_messages <<16>>(x00000000 , x07050301 , KJ);
m20 = MAC_long_messages <<20>>(x00000000 , x00000000 , KJ);
m256 = MAC_long_messages <<256>>(x00000000 , x07050301 , KJ);
m4100 = MAC_long_messages <<4100>>( x00000000 , x07050301 , KJ);
v = (m20 = xDB79FBDC) and (m16 = x8CE37709) and
(m256 = x717153D5) and (m4100 = x7783C51D );
tel;
Note that these recursive nodes are not available in SCADE. Thus, we did not implement the three
supplementary test vectors [7] for the SCADE model.
The Lutin environment constrains the input of the MAA to one out of four messages, each one
containing two words. Note that if the input values are not explicitly constrained in the Lutin environ-
ment, random numbers will be generated. The environment contains the 12 possible pairs of keys and
messages. Although larger and more complex environments could be written, this task is tedious and
error-prone, in particular due to the representation of messages and keys by natural numbers. In our
example, correct tests consist of a correct MAC value, given one key and a message. A small excerpt of
oracle for our Lustre model is given by the following Lustre code, containing the test decisions and the
expected output: the auxiliary block values of X, Y and MAC value for each message block given in the
first columnn of [6, Table 6].
node oracle (id: int; init: bool; X, Y, Z: Block; n: int)
returns (res: bool);
let
res = true ->
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((id = 1 and init and X = x48B204D6 and Y = x5834A585) or
(id = 2 and init and X = x6AEBACF8 and Y = x9DB15CF6) or ...
and CHECK () = true and check_long_message () = true);
tel;
The whole Lutin scenario and Lustre oracle for testing the Lustre model with the test vector (T3) will
appear in the MARS Workshop repository.
The Lustre and the test scenarios for the sets of test vectors (T1), (T2), (T3), (T4) has 1908 lines and
contains 9 types (structures), 442 constants, 100 functions, and 4 nodes. Our Lustre model of the MAA
was successfully validated by the 203 tests.
4.2 Validation of the SCADE model
We automate the test execution process, by using the SCADE test environment toolset. To achieve this
goal, one has to write a test scenario in an SSS file, with the description of the test sequences for testing
the main MAC node. The scenario sets the input values and defines the expected output values to be
checked. For instance, for our SCADE MAA model, expected output values consist of the correct MAC
value (Z) or the three intermediate values (X, Y, and V), given one key and a message as inputs. A small
excerpt of the test scenario is given by the following SCADE code, containing the input sequences: a
key, a message block and a boolean indicating if it is the first block of the message. The expected outputs
are the auxiliary block values of X, Y and MAC value for each block of message given in [6, Table 6]:
## −− i n p u t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
# −− Key
SSM::set MAC/KJ
(((X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0),(X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0),
(X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0,X0,X0),(X0,X0,X0,X0,X0,X0,X0,X0)),
((X0,X0,X0,X0,X0,X0,X0 ,X0),(X1 ,X1 ,X1 ,X1 ,X1 ,X1 ,X1 ,X1),
(X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0,X0,X0),(X1,X1,X1,X1,X1,X1,X1,X1)))
# −− B l o c k
SSM::set MAC/Mn
((X0 ,X1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X0 ,X1),(X0 ,X1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X0 ,X1),
(X0,X1,X0,X1,X0,X1,X0,X1),(X0,X1,X0,X1,X0,X1,X0,X1))
SSM::set MAC/init true
## −− o u t p u t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
# −− B l o c k
SSM:: check MAC/X
((X0,X1,X0,X0,X1 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0),(X1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X1 ,X0 ,X0 ,X1 ,X0),
(X0 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0,X0,X1,X0,X0),(X1,X1,X0,X1,X0,X1,X1,X0))
SSM:: check MAC/Y
((X0,X1,X0,X1,X1 ,X0 ,X0 ,X0),(X0 ,X0 ,X1 ,X1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X0 ,X0),
(X1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X0,X0,X1,X0,X1),(X1,X0,X0,X0,X0,X1,X0,X1))




The SCADE scenario files (.sss) contain the following instructions:
• SSM::set: assign a specific value to an input for the next execution cycle;
• SSM::check: register a test of an output against a specified value;
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• SSM::uncheck: unregister the active test for an observable output;
• SSM::cycle: set the number of execution cycles in a test sequence (the default number of cycles is
set to 1 when no argument is specified);
• #: comment the line.
Note that tests are registered by the next calls to SSM::cycle instruction. The whole scenario for testing
our SCADE model with the test vector (T3) will appear in the MARS Workshop repository. The test
vector with long messages (i.e., containing more than two blocks) and the test vectors for the auxiliary
functions are hard coded in functions, as for instance, the twenty-words message in the Appendix Q.
The SCADE model and the test scenarios for the sets of test vectors (T1), (T2), (T3), (T4), which
is 201 tests in total, have 1894 lines and contain 9 types (structures), 442 constants, 99 functions, and 2
nodes. Our SCADE model of the MAA was successfully validated by these 201 tests.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a formal SCADE model of the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA).
First, we gave an overview of this cryptographic functions for computing a Message Authentication
Code, then we discussed the choices and the challenges of this implementation in SCADE and compared
it to the Lustre implementation. Finally we validated our model using the test test vectors derived from
the specification in [6]
The modelling of the MAA and its validation enabled us to find three errors in the Lustre v6 toolbox:
(i) lv6 compiler generates invalid C code if a variable identifier uses quotes (’); (ii) another issue with
constant structures and the compiler lv6; and (iii) Lurette tool ignoring -2c-exec option; all these errors
have been communicated to the Lustre v6 developers and have been quickly fixed by the team. The
modelling of the SCADE model enabled us to improve the Lustre model, more precisely by detecting
potentially non-initialized variables and unused variables.
Since neither SCADE, nor Lustre implements the list data type, we had to consider only messages
with fixed size in our SCADE model. However, in our Lustre model, we could generate pseudo-random
messages by adding a recursive node. It is however fair to warn the reader that testing our Lustre/SCADE
MAA models was a tedious task, i.e., we had to manually define more than 400 constants.
In this paper we only have written the main node computing the MAC with the graphical language
SCADE. As future work, the full MAA algorithm or at least its main functions could be designed with
the graphical language SCADE and some test scenarios could also be simulated on the graphical nodes.
To improve the code efficiency, one could as well implement blocks and arithmetic operations on blocks
in external fragments of code written in C, and import them in the Lustre/SCADE models.
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A Formal Model of the MAA in SCADE
This annex presents the specification of the MAA in the SCADE language. This specification is fully
self-contained, meaning that it does not depend on any externally-defined library – with the minor disad-
vantage of somewhat lengthy definitions for byte and blocks constants. For readability, the specification
has been split into 16 parts, each part being devoted to a particular type, a group of functions sharing
a common purpose, or a collection of test vectors. The first parts contain general definitions that are
largely independent from the MAA; starting from Section K, the definitions become increasingly more
MAA-specific. All machine words (bytes, blocks, etc.) are represented according to the “big endian”
convention, i.e., the first argument of each corresponding constructor denote the most significant bit.
B Definitions for type Bit
We define bits using an enumeration Bit (X0 and X1), together with functions implementing logical
operations on bits.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type Bit = enum {X0 , X1};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function notBit (x1: Bit) returns (x: Bit)
x = if x1 = X0 then X1 else X0;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function andBit (x1, x2: Bit) returns (x: Bit)
x = if x2 = X0 then X0 else x1;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function orBit (x1, x2: Bit) returns (x: Bit)
x = if x2 = X0 then x1 else X1;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function xorBit (x1, x2: Bit) returns (x: Bit)
x = if x2 = X0 then x1 else notBit (x1);
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C Definitions for Type Byte
We define bytes (octets) using a structure Octet that contains the eight bits of a byte, together with
functions implementing bitwise logical operations, left-shift and right-shift operations on bytes, as well
as all byte constants needed to formally describe the MAA and its test vectors.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type Octet = {x1: Bit , x2: Bit , x3: Bit , x4: Bit ,
x5: Bit , x6: Bit , x7: Bit , x8: Bit};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
const
x00:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0, x8: X0};
x01:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0, x8: X1};
x02:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
164 Specifying a Cryptographical Protocol in Lustre and SCADE
x03:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x04:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x05:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x06:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x07:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x08:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x09:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x0A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x0B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x0C:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x0D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x0E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x0F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x10:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x11:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x12:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x13:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x14:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x15:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x16:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x17:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x18:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x1A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x1B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x1C:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x1D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
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x1E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x1F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x20:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x21:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x22:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x23:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x24:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x25:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x26:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x27:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x28:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x29:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x2A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x2B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x2D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x2E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x2F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x30:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x31:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x32:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x33:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x34:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x35:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x36:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x37:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x38:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
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x39:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x3A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x3B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x3C:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x3D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x3E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x3F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x40:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x41:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x42:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x43:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x44:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x45:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x46:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x47:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x48:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x49:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x4A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x4B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x4C:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x4D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x4E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x4F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x50:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x51:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x53:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
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x54:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x55:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x58:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x5A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x5B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x5C:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x5D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x5E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x5F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x60:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x61:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x62:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x63:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x64:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x65:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x66:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x67:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x69:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x6A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x6B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x6C:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x6D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x6E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x6F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x70:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x71:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
168 Specifying a Cryptographical Protocol in Lustre and SCADE
x72:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x73:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x74:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x75:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x76:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x77:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x78:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x79:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x7A:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x7B:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x7C:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x7D:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x7E:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x7F:Octet = {x1: X0 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x80:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x81:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x83:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x84:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x85:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x86:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x89:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x8C:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x8D:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x8E:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x8F:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x90:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
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x91:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x92:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x93:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x94:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x95:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x96:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x97:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x98:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x99:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x9A:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x9B:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
x9C:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
x9D:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
x9E:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
x9F:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xA1:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xA0:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xA3:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xA4:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xA5:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xA6:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xA7:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xA8:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xA9:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xAA:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xAB:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
170 Specifying a Cryptographical Protocol in Lustre and SCADE
xAC:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xAE:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xAF:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xB0:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xB1:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xB2:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xB3:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xB5:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xB6:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xB8:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xB9:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xBA:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xBB:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xBC:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xBE:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xBF:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X0 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xC0:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xC1:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xC2:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xC4:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xC5:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xC6:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xC7:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xC8:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xC9:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xCA:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
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xCB:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xCC:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xCD:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xCE:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xD0:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xD1:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xD2:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xD3:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xD4:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xD5:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xD6:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xD7:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xD9:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xD8:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xDB:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xDC:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xDD:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xDE:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xDF:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X0 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xE0:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xE1:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xE2:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xE3:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xE6:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xE8:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xE9:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
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xEA:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xEB:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xEC:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xED:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xEE:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xEF:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X0 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xF0:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xF1:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xF2:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xF3:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xF4:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xF5:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xF6:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xF7:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X0, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xF8:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xF9:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xFA:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xFB:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X0, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
xFC:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X0};
xFD:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X0 , x8: X1};
xFE:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X0};
xFF:Octet = {x1: X1 , x2: X1 , x3: X1 , x4: X1 ,
x5: X1, x6: X1, x7: X1 , x8: X1};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function eqOctet (o1, o2: Octet) returns (res: bool)
res = ((o1.x1 = o2.x1) and (o1.x2 = o2.x2) and (o1.x3 = o2.x3) and
(o1.x4 = o2.x4) and (o1.x5 = o2.x5) and (o1.x6 = o2.x6)
and (o1.x7 = o2.x7) and (o1.x8 = o2.x8));
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function andOctet (o1, o2: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: andBit (o1.x1, o2.x1), x2: andBit (o1.x2, o2.x2),
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x3: andBit (o1.x3 , o2.x3), x4: andBit (o1.x4 , o2.x4),
x5: andBit (o1.x5 , o2.x5), x6: andBit (o1.x6 , o2.x6),
x7: andBit (o1.x7 , o2.x7), x8: andBit (o1.x8 , o2.x8)};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function orOctet (o1, o2: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: orBit (o1.x1, o2.x1), x2: orBit (o1.x2, o2.x2),
x3: orBit (o1.x3 , o2.x3), x4: orBit (o1.x4 , o2.x4),
x5: orBit (o1.x5 , o2.x5), x6: orBit (o1.x6 , o2.x6),
x7: orBit (o1.x7 , o2.x7), x8: orBit (o1.x8 , o2.x8)};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function xorOctet (o1, o2: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: xorBit (o1.x1, o2.x1), x2: xorBit (o1.x2, o2.x2),
x3: xorBit (o1.x3 , o2.x3), x4: xorBit (o1.x4 , o2.x4),
x5: xorBit (o1.x5 , o2.x5), x6: xorBit (o1.x6 , o2.x6),
x7: xorBit (o1.x7 , o2.x7), x8: xorBit (o1.x8 , o2.x8)};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function leftOctet1 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: o1.x2, x2: o1.x3, x3: o1.x4, x4: o1.x5,
x5: o1.x6 , x6: o1.x7 , x7: o1.x8 , x8: X0};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function leftOctet2 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: o1.x3, x2: o1.x4, x3: o1.x5, x4: o1.x6,
x5: o1.x7 , x6: o1.x8 , x7: X0 , x8: X0};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function leftOctet3 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: o1.x4, x2: o1.x5, x3: o1.x6, x4: o1.x7,
x5: o1.x8 , x6: X0 , x7: X0 , x8: X0};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function leftOctet4 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: o1.x5, x2: o1.x6, x3: o1.x7, x4: o1.x8,
x5: X0 , x6: X0 , x7: X0 , x8: X0};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function leftOctet5 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: o1.x6, x2: o1.x7, x3: o1.x8, x4: X0,
x5: X0 , x6: X0 , x7: X0 , x8: X0};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function leftOctet6 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: o1.x7, x2: o1.x8, x3: X0, x4: X0,
x5: X0 , x6: X0 , x7: X0 , x8: X0};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function leftOctet7 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: o1.x8, x2: X0, x3: X0, x4: X0,
x5: X0 , x6: X0 , x7: X0 , x8: X0};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function rightOctet1 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: X0, x2: o1.x1, x3: o1.x2, x4: o1.x3,
x5: o1.x4 , x6: o1.x5 , x7: o1.x6 , x8: o1.x7};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function rightOctet2 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: X0, x2: X0, x3: o1.x1, x4: o1.x2,
x5: o1.x3 , x6: o1.x4 , x7: o1.x5 , x8: o1.x6};
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function rightOctet3 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: X0, x2: X0, x3: X0, x4: o1.x1,
x5: o1.x2 , x6: o1.x3 , x7: o1.x4 , x8: o1.x5};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function rightOctet4 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: X0, x2: X0, x3: X0, x4: X0,
x5: o1.x1 , x6: o1.x2 , x7: o1.x3 , x8: o1.x4};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function rightOctet5 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: X0, x2: X0, x3: X0, x4: X0,
x5: X0 , x6: o1.x1 , x7: o1.x2 , x8: o1.x3};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function rightOctet6 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: X0, x2: X0, x3: X0, x4: X0,
x5: X0 , x6: X0 , x7: o1.x1 , x8: o1.x2};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function rightOctet7 (o1: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: X0, x2: X0, x3: X0, x4: X0,
x5: X0 , x6: X0 , x7: X0 , x8: o1.x1};
D Definitions for Type OctetSum
We define type OctetSum that stores the result of the addition of two octets. Values of this type are
9-bit words, made up using the structure OctetSum that gathers one bit for the carry and an octet for the
sum. The two principal functions for this type are addOctetSum (which adds two octets and an input
carry bit, and returns both an output carry bit and an 8-bit sum), and addOctet (which is derived from
the former one by dropping the input and output carry bits); the other functions are auxiliary functions
implementing an 8-bit adder.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type OctetSum = {x: Bit , o: Octet};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addBit (x1, x2, x3: Bit) returns (x: Bit)
x = xorBit (xorBit (x1, x2), x3);
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function carBit (x1, x2, x3: Bit) returns (x: Bit)
x = orBit (andBit (andBit (x1, x2), notBit (x3)),
andBit (orBit (x1 , x2), x3));
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addOctetSum (o1, o2: Octet; x: Bit) returns (os: OctetSum)
var x1 , x11 , x2 , x22 , x3 , x33 , x4 , x44 , x5 , x55: Bit;
x6, x66 , x7, x77 , x8, x88: Bit;
let
x1 = carBit (o1.x8 , o2.x8 , x);
x11 = addBit (o1.x8 , o2.x8 , x);
x2 = carBit (o1.x7 , o2.x7 , x1);
x22 = addBit (o1.x7 , o2.x7 , x1);
x3 = carBit (o1.x6 , o2.x6 , x2);
x33 = addBit (o1.x6 , o2.x6 , x2);
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x4 = carBit (o1.x5 , o2.x5 , x3);
x44 = addBit (o1.x5 , o2.x5 , x3);
x5 = carBit (o1.x4 , o2.x4 , x4);
x55 = addBit (o1.x4 , o2.x4 , x4);
x6 = carBit (o1.x3 , o2.x3 , x5);
x66 = addBit (o1.x3 , o2.x3 , x5);
x7 = carBit (o1.x2 , o2.x2 , x6);
x77 = addBit (o1.x2 , o2.x2 , x6);
x8 = carBit (o1.x1 , o2.x1 , x7);
x88 = addBit (o1.x1 , o2.x1 , x7);
os = {x: x8 , o: {x1: x88 , x2: x77 , x3: x66 , x4: x55 ,
x5: x44 , x6: x33 , x7: x22 , x8: x11 }};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function dropCarryOctetSum (os: OctetSum) returns (o: Octet)
o = os.o;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addOctet (o1, o2: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = dropCarryOctetSum (addOctetSum (o1, o2, X0));
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
E Definitions for Type Half
We define 16-bit words (“named half words”) using a structure Half that contains two bytes correspond-
ing to a half word, together with two usual constants, and a function implementing operation mulOctet
that takes two octets and computes their 16-bit product; the other functions are auxiliary functions im-
plementing an 8-bit multiplier.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type Half = {o1: Octet , o2: Octet};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
const
x0000:Half = {o1: x00 , o2: x00};
x0001:Half = {o1: x00 , o2: x01};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function mulOctetA (h1: Half; o1, o2: Octet) returns (h: Half)
var o3: Octet; os: OctetSum;
let
o3 = addOctet (h1.o1 , o1);
os = addOctetSum (h1.o2 , o2 , X0);
h = if os.x = X0 then {o1: o3, o2: os.o}
else {o1: addOctet (o3 , x01), o2: os.o};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function mulOctet (o1, o2: Octet) returns (h: Half)
var h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7: Half;
let
h1 = if o1.x1 = X0 then x0000
else mulOctetA (x0000 , rightOctet1 (o2), leftOctet7 (o2));
h2 = if o1.x2 = X0 then h1
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else mulOctetA (h1, rightOctet2 (o2), leftOctet6 (o2));
h3 = if o1.x3 = X0 then h2
else mulOctetA (h2, rightOctet3 (o2), leftOctet5 (o2));
h4 = if o1.x4 = X0 then h3
else mulOctetA (h3, rightOctet4 (o2), leftOctet4 (o2));
h5 = if o1.x5 = X0 then h4
else mulOctetA (h4, rightOctet5 (o2), leftOctet3 (o2));
h6 = if o1.x6 = X0 then h5
else mulOctetA (h5, rightOctet6 (o2), leftOctet2 (o2));
h7 = if o1.x7 = X0 then h6
else mulOctetA (h6, rightOctet7 (o2), leftOctet1 (o2));
h = if o1.x8 = X0 then h7
else mulOctetA (h7, x00 , o2);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
F Definitions for Type HalfSum
We define type HalfSum that stores the result of the addition of two half words. Values of this type are
17-bit words, made up using the constructor buildHalfSum that gathers one bit for the carry and a half
word for the sum. The five principal non-constructors for this type are eqHalfSum (which tests equality),
addHalfSum (which adds two half words and returns both a carry bit and a 16-bit sum), addHalf (which
is derived from the former one by dropping the carry bit), addHalfOctet and addHalfOctets (which are
similar to the former one but take byte arguments that are converted to half words before summation); the
other non-constructors are auxiliary functions implementing a 16-bit adder built using two 8-bit adders.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type HalfSum = {x: Bit , h: Half};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addHalfSum (h1, h2: Half) returns (hs: HalfSum)
var os , os1: OctetSum;
let
os = addOctetSum (h1.o2 , h2.o2 , X0);
os1 = addOctetSum (h1.o1 , h2.o1 , os.x);
hs = {x: os1.x, h: {o1: os1.o, o2: os.o}};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function dropCarryHalfSum (hs: HalfSum) returns (h: Half)
h = hs.h;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addHalf (h1, h2: Half) returns (h: Half)
h = dropCarryHalfSum (addHalfSum (h1, h2));
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addHalfOctet (o1: Octet; h1: Half) returns (h: Half)
h = addHalf ({o1: x00 , o2: o1}, h1);
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addHalfOctets (o1, o2: Octet) returns (h: Half)
h = addHalf ({o1: x00 , o2: o1}, {o1: x00 , o2: o2});
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
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G Definitions for Type Block
We define 32-bit words (named “blocks” according to the MAA terminology) using a constructor build-
Block that takes four bytes and returns a block. The seven principal non-constructors for this type are
eqBlock (which tests equality), andBlock, orBlock, and xorBlock (which implement bitwise logical op-
erations on blocks), HalfU and HalfL (which decompose a block into two half words), and mulHalf
(which takes two half words and computes their 32-bit product); the other non-constructors are auxiliary
functions implementing a 16-bit multiplier built using four 8-bit multipliers, as well as all block constants
needed to formally describe the MAA and its test vectors.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type Block = {o1: Octet , o2: Octet , o3: Octet , o4: Octet};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
const
x00000000:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x00000001:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x01};
x00000002:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x02};
x00000003:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x03};
x00000004:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x04};
x00000005:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x05};
x00000006:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x06};
x00000007:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x07};
x00000008:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x08};
x00000009:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x09};
x0000000A:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x0A};
x0000000B:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x0B};
x0000000C:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x0C};
x0000000D:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x0D};
x0000000E:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x0E};
x0000000F:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x0F};
x00000010:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x10};
x00000012:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x12};
x00000014:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x14};
x00000016:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x16};
x00000018:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x18};
x0000001B:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x1B};
x0000001D:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x1D};
x0000001E:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x1E};
x0000001F:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x1F};
x00000031:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x31};
x00000036:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x36};
x00000060:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x60};
x00000080:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x80};
x000000A5:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: xA5};
x000000B6:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: xB6};
x000000C4:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: xC4};
x000000D2:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: xD2};
x00000100:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x01 , o4: x00};
x00000129:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x01 , o4: x29};
x0000018C:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x01 , o4: x8C};
x00004000:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: x40 , o4: x00};
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x00010000:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x01 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x00020000:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x02 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x00030000:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x03 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x00040000:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x04 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x00060000:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x06 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x00804021:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: x80 , o3: x40 , o4: x21};
x00FF00FF:Block = {o1: x00 , o2: xFF , o3: x00 , o4: xFF};
x0103050B:Block = {o1: x01 , o2: x03 , o3: x05 , o4: x0B};
x01030703:Block = {o1: x01 , o2: x03 , o3: x07 , o4: x03};
x01030705:Block = {o1: x01 , o2: x03 , o3: x07 , o4: x05};
x0103070F:Block = {o1: x01 , o2: x03 , o3: x07 , o4: x0F};
x02040801:Block = {o1: x02 , o2: x04 , o3: x08 , o4: x01};
x0297AF6F:Block = {o1: x02 , o2: x97 , o3: xAF , o4: x6F};
x07050301:Block = {o1: x07 , o2: x05 , o3: x03 , o4: x01};
x07C72EAA:Block = {o1: x07 , o2: xC7 , o3: x2E , o4: xAA};
x0A202020:Block = {o1: x0A , o2: x20 , o3: x20 , o4: x20};
x0AD67E20:Block = {o1: x0A , o2: xD6 , o3: x7E , o4: x20};
x10000000:Block = {o1: x10 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x11A9D254:Block = {o1: x11 , o2: xA9 , o3: xD2 , o4: x54};
x11AC46B8:Block = {o1: x11 , o2: xAC , o3: x46 , o4: xB8};
x1277A6D4:Block = {o1: x12 , o2: x77 , o3: xA6 , o4: xD4};
x13647149:Block = {o1: x13 , o2: x64 , o3: x71 , o4: x49};
x160EE9B5:Block = {o1: x16 , o2: x0E , o3: xE9 , o4: xB5};
x17065DBB:Block = {o1: x17 , o2: x06 , o3: x5D , o4: xBB};
x1D10D8D3:Block = {o1: x1D , o2: x10 , o3: xD8 , o4: xD3};
x1D3B7760:Block = {o1: x1D , o2: x3B , o3: x77 , o4: x60};
x1D9C9655:Block = {o1: x1D , o2: x9C , o3: x96 , o4: x55};
x1F3F7FFF:Block = {o1: x1F , o2: x3F , o3: x7F , o4: xFF};
x21D869BA:Block = {o1: x21 , o2: xD8 , o3: x69 , o4: xBA};
x24B66FB5:Block = {o1: x24 , o2: xB6 , o3: x6F , o4: xB5};
x270EEDAF:Block = {o1: x27 , o2: x0E , o3: xED , o4: xAF};
x277B4B25:Block = {o1: x27 , o2: x7B , o3: x4B , o4: x25};
x2829040B:Block = {o1: x28 , o2: x29 , o3: x04 , o4: x0B};
x288FC786:Block = {o1: x28 , o2: x8F , o3: xC7 , o4: x86};
x28EAD8B3:Block = {o1: x28 , o2: xEA , o3: xD8 , o4: xB3};
x29907CD8:Block = {o1: x29 , o2: x90 , o3: x7C , o4: xD8};
x29C1485F:Block = {o1: x29 , o2: xC1 , o3: x48 , o4: x5F};
x29EEE96B:Block = {o1: x29 , o2: xEE , o3: xE9 , o4: x6B};
x2A6091AE:Block = {o1: x2A , o2: x60 , o3: x91 , o4: xAE};
x2BF8499A:Block = {o1: x2B , o2: xF8 , o3: x49 , o4: x9A};
x2E80AC30:Block = {o1: x2E , o2: x80 , o3: xAC , o4: x30};
x2FD76FFB:Block = {o1: x2F , o2: xD7 , o3: x6F , o4: xFB};
x30261492:Block = {o1: x30 , o2: x26 , o3: x14 , o4: x92};
x303FF4AA:Block = {o1: x30 , o2: x3F , o3: xF4 , o4: xAA};
x33D5A466:Block = {o1: x33 , o2: xD5 , o3: xA4 , o4: x66};
x344925FC:Block = {o1: x34 , o2: x49 , o3: x25 , o4: xFC};
x34ACF886:Block = {o1: x34 , o2: xAC , o3: xF8 , o4: x86};
x3CD54DEB:Block = {o1: x3C , o2: xD5 , o3: x4D , o4: xEB};
x3CF3A7D2:Block = {o1: x3C , o2: xF3 , o3: xA7 , o4: xD2};
x3DD81AC6:Block = {o1: x3D , o2: xD8 , o3: x1A , o4: xC6};
x3F6F7248:Block = {o1: x3F , o2: x6F , o3: x72 , o4: x48};
x48B204D6:Block = {o1: x48 , o2: xB2 , o3: x04 , o4: xD6};
L. Marsso 179
x4A645A01:Block = {o1: x4A , o2: x64 , o3: x5A , o4: x01};
x4C49AAE0:Block = {o1: x4C , o2: x49 , o3: xAA , o4: xE0};
x4CE933E1:Block = {o1: x4C , o2: xE9 , o3: x33 , o4: xE1};
x4D53901A:Block = {o1: x4D , o2: x53 , o3: x90 , o4: x1A};
x4DA124A1:Block = {o1: x4D , o2: xA1 , o3: x24 , o4: xA1};
x4F998E01:Block = {o1: x4F , o2: x99 , o3: x8E , o4: x01};
x50DEC930:Block = {o1: x50 , o2: xDE , o3: xC9 , o4: x30};
x51AF3C1D:Block = {o1: x51 , o2: xAF , o3: x3C , o4: x1D};
x51EDE9C7:Block = {o1: x51 , o2: xED , o3: xE9 , o4: xC7};
x550D91CE:Block = {o1: x55 , o2: x0D , o3: x91 , o4: xCE};
x55555555:Block = {o1: x55 , o2: x55 , o3: x55 , o4: x55};
x55DD063F:Block = {o1: x55 , o2: xDD , o3: x06 , o4: x3F};
x5834A585:Block = {o1: x58 , o2: x34 , o3: xA5 , o4: x85};
x5A35D667:Block = {o1: x5A , o2: x35 , o3: xD6 , o4: x67};
x5BC02502:Block = {o1: x5B , o2: xC0 , o3: x25 , o4: x02};
x5CCA3239:Block = {o1: x5C , o2: xCA , o3: x32 , o4: x39};
x5EBA06C2:Block = {o1: x5E , o2: xBA , o3: x06 , o4: xC2};
xF0239DD5:Block = {o1: xF0 , o2: x23 , o3: x9D , o4: xD5};
x5F38EEF1:Block = {o1: x5F , o2: x38 , o3: xEE , o4: xF1};
x613F8E2A:Block = {o1: x61 , o2: x3F , o3: x8E , o4: x2A};
x63C70DBA:Block = {o1: x63 , o2: xC7 , o3: x0D , o4: xBA};
x6AD6E8A4:Block = {o1: x6A , o2: xD6 , o3: xE8 , o4: xA4};
x6AEBACF8:Block = {o1: x6A , o2: xEB , o3: xAC , o4: xF8};
x6D67E884:Block = {o1: x6D , o2: x67 , o3: xE8 , o4: x84};
x7050EC5E:Block = {o1: x70 , o2: x50 , o3: xEC , o4: x5E};
x717153D5:Block = {o1: x71 , o2: x71 , o3: x53 , o4: xD5};
x7201F4DC:Block = {o1: x72 , o2: x01 , o3: xF4 , o4: xDC};
x7397C9AE:Block = {o1: x73 , o2: x97 , o3: xC9 , o4: xAE};
x74B39176:Block = {o1: x74 , o2: xB3 , o3: x91 , o4: x76};
x7783C51D:Block = {o1: x77 , o2: x83 , o3: xC5 , o4: x1D};
x7792F9D4:Block = {o1: x77 , o2: x92 , o3: xF9 , o4: xD4};
x7BC180AB:Block = {o1: x7B , o2: xC1 , o3: x80 , o4: xAB};
x7DB2D9F4:Block = {o1: x7D , o2: xB2 , o3: xD9 , o4: xF4};
x7DFEFBFF:Block = {o1: x7D , o2: xFE , o3: xFB , o4: xFF};
x7F76A3B0:Block = {o1: x7F , o2: x76 , o3: xA3 , o4: xB0};
x7F839576:Block = {o1: x7F , o2: x83 , o3: x95 , o4: x76};
x7FFFFFF0:Block = {o1: x7F , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF0};
x7FFFFFF1:Block = {o1: x7F , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF1};
x7FFFFFFC:Block = {o1: x7F , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFC};
x7FFFFFFD:Block = {o1: x7F , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFD};
x80000000:Block = {o1: x80 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x00};
x80000002:Block = {o1: x80 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: x02};
x800000C2:Block = {o1: x80 , o2: x00 , o3: x00 , o4: xC2};
x80018000:Block = {o1: x80 , o2: x01 , o3: x80 , o4: x00};
x80018001:Block = {o1: x80 , o2: x01 , o3: x80 , o4: x01};
x80397302:Block = {o1: x80 , o2: x39 , o3: x73 , o4: x02};
x81D10CA3:Block = {o1: x81 , o2: xD1 , o3: x0C , o4: xA3};
x89D635D7:Block = {o1: x89 , o2: xD6 , o3: x35 , o4: xD7};
x8CE37709:Block = {o1: x8C , o2: xE3 , o3: x77 , o4: x09};
x8DC8BBDE:Block = {o1: x8D , o2: xC8 , o3: xBB , o4: xDE};
x9115A558:Block = {o1: x91 , o2: x15 , o3: xA5 , o4: x58};
x91896CFA:Block = {o1: x91 , o2: x89 , o3: x6C , o4: xFA};
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x9372CDC6:Block = {o1: x93 , o2: x72 , o3: xCD , o4: xC6};
x98D1CC75:Block = {o1: x98 , o2: xD1 , o3: xCC , o4: x75};
x9D15C437:Block = {o1: x9D , o2: x15 , o3: xC4 , o4: x37};
x9DB15CF6:Block = {o1: x9D , o2: xB1 , o3: x5C , o4: xF6};
x9E2E7B36:Block = {o1: x9E , o2: x2E , o3: x7B , o4: x36};
xA018C83B:Block = {o1: xA0 , o2: x18 , o3: xC8 , o4: x3B};
xA0B87B77:Block = {o1: xA0 , o2: xB8 , o3: x7B , o4: x77};
xA44AAAC0:Block = {o1: xA4 , o2: x4A , o3: xAA , o4: xC0};
xA511987A:Block = {o1: xA5 , o2: x11 , o3: x98 , o4: x7A};
xA70FC148:Block = {o1: xA7 , o2: x0F , o3: xC1 , o4: x48};
xA93BD410:Block = {o1: xA9 , o2: x3B , o3: xD4 , o4: x10};
xAAAAAAAA:Block = {o1: xAA , o2: xAA , o3: xAA , o4: xAA};
xAB00FFCD:Block = {o1: xAB , o2: x00 , o3: xFF , o4: xCD};
xAB01FCCD:Block = {o1: xAB , o2: x01 , o3: xFC , o4: xCD};
xAB6EED4A:Block = {o1: xAB , o2: x6E , o3: xED , o4: x4A};
xABEEED6B:Block = {o1: xAB , o2: xEE , o3: xED , o4: x6B};
xACBC13DD:Block = {o1: xAC , o2: xBC , o3: x13 , o4: xDD};
xB1CC1CC5:Block = {o1: xB1 , o2: xCC , o3: x1C , o4: xC5};
xB8142629:Block = {o1: xB8 , o2: x14 , o3: x26 , o4: x29};
xB99A62DE:Block = {o1: xB9 , o2: x9A , o3: x62 , o4: xDE};
xBA92DB12:Block = {o1: xBA , o2: x92 , o3: xDB , o4: x12};
xBBA57835:Block = {o1: xBB , o2: xA5 , o3: x78 , o4: x35};
xBE9F0917:Block = {o1: xBE , o2: x9F , o3: x09 , o4: x17};
xBF2D7D85:Block = {o1: xBF , o2: x2D , o3: x7D , o4: x85};
xBFEF7FDF:Block = {o1: xBF , o2: xEF , o3: x7F , o4: xDF};
xC1ED90DD:Block = {o1: xC1 , o2: xED , o3: x90 , o4: xDD};
xC21A1846:Block = {o1: xC2 , o2: x1A , o3: x18 , o4: x46};
xC4EB1AEB:Block = {o1: xC4 , o2: xEB , o3: x1A , o4: xEB};
xC6B1317E:Block = {o1: xC6 , o2: xB1 , o3: x31 , o4: x7E};
xCBC865BA:Block = {o1: xCB , o2: xC8 , o3: x65 , o4: xBA};
xCD959B46:Block = {o1: xCD , o2: x95 , o3: x9B , o4: x46};
xD0482465:Block = {o1: xD0 , o2: x48 , o3: x24 , o4: x65};
xD636250D:Block = {o1: xD6 , o2: x36 , o3: x25 , o4: x0D};
xD7843FDC:Block = {o1: xD7 , o2: x84 , o3: x3F , o4: xDC};
xD78634BC:Block = {o1: xD7 , o2: x86 , o3: x34 , o4: xBC};
xD8804CA5:Block = {o1: xD8 , o2: x80 , o3: x4C , o4: xA5};
xDB79FBDC:Block = {o1: xDB , o2: x79 , o3: xFB , o4: xDC};
xDB9102B0:Block = {o1: xDB , o2: x91 , o3: x02 , o4: xB0};
xE0C08000:Block = {o1: xE0 , o2: xC0 , o3: x80 , o4: x00};
xE6A12F07:Block = {o1: xE6 , o2: xA1 , o3: x2F , o4: x07};
xEB35B97F:Block = {o1: xEB , o2: x35 , o3: xB9 , o4: x7F};
xF14D6E28:Block = {o1: xF1 , o2: x4D , o3: x6E , o4: x28};
xF2EF3501:Block = {o1: xF2 , o2: xEF , o3: x35 , o4: x01};
xF6A09667:Block = {o1: xF6 , o2: xA0 , o3: x96 , o4: x67};
xFD297DA4:Block = {o1: xFD , o2: x29 , o3: x7D , o4: xA4};
xFDC1A8BA:Block = {o1: xFD , o2: xC1 , o3: xA8 , o4: xBA};
xFE4E5BDD:Block = {o1: xFE , o2: x4E , o3: x5B , o4: xDD};
xFECCAA6E:Block = {o1: xFE , o2: xCC , o3: xAA , o4: x6E};
xFEFC07F0:Block = {o1: xFE , o2: xFC , o3: x07 , o4: xF0};
xFF2D7DA5:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: x2D , o3: x7D , o4: xA5};
xFFEF0001:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xEF , o3: x00 , o4: x01};
xFFFF00FF:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: x00 , o4: xFF};
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xFFFFFF2D:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: x2D};
xFFFFFF3A:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: x3A};
xFFFFFFF0:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF0};
xFFFFFFF1:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF1};
xFFFFFFF4:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF4};
xFFFFFFF5:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF5};
xFFFFFFF7:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF7};
xFFFFFFF9:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xF9};
xFFFFFFFA:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFA};
xFFFFFFFB:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFB};
xFFFFFFFC:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFC};
xFFFFFFFD:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFD};
xFFFFFFFE:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFE};
xFFFFFFFF:Block = {o1: xFF , o2: xFF , o3: xFF , o4: xFF};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function eqBlock (w1, w2: Block) returns (res: bool)
res = ((w1.o1 = w2.o2) and (w1.o2 = w2.o2) and (w1.o3 = w2.o3) and
(w1.o4 = w2.o4));
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function andBlock (w1, w2: Block) returns (w: Block)
w = {o1: andOctet (w1.o1, w2.o1), o2: andOctet (w1.o2, w2.o2),
o3: andOctet (w1.o3 , w2.o3), o4: andOctet (w1.o4 , w2.o4)};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function orBlock (w1, w2: Block) returns (w: Block)
w = {o1: orOctet (w1.o1, w2.o1), o2: orOctet (w1.o2, w2.o2),
o3: orOctet (w1.o3 , w2.o3), o4: orOctet (w1.o4 , w2.o4)};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function xorBlock (w1, w2: Block) returns (w: Block)
w = {o1: xorOctet (w1.o1, w2.o1), o2: xorOctet (w1.o2, w2.o2),
o3: xorOctet (w1.o3 , w2.o3), o4: xorOctet (w1.o4 , w2.o4)};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function HalfU (w: Block) returns (o1o2: Half)
o1o2 = {o1: w.o1 , o2: w.o2};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function HalfL (w: Block) returns (o3o4: Half)
o3o4 = {o1: w.o3 , o2: w.o4};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function mulHalf (h1, h2: Half) returns (w: Block)
var h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7 , h8 , h9: Half;
let
h3 = mulOctet (h1.o1 , h2.o1);
h4 = mulOctet (h1.o1 , h2.o2);
h5 = mulOctet (h1.o2 , h2.o1);
h6 = mulOctet (h1.o2 , h2.o2);
h7 = addHalfOctet (h4.o2 , addHalfOctets (h5.o2 , h6.o1));
h8 = addHalfOctet (h7.o1 , addHalfOctet (h3.o2 ,
addHalfOctets (h4.o1, h5.o1)));
h9 = addHalfOctets (h8.o1 , h3.o1);
w = {o1: h9.o2, o2: h8.o2, o3: h7.o2, o4: h6.o2};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
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H Definitions for Type BlockSum
We define type BlockSum that stores the result of the addition of two blocks. Values of this type are
33-bit words, made up using the constructor buildBlockSum that gathers one bit for the carry and a block
for the sum. The five principal non-constructors for this type are eqBlockSum (which tests equality),
addBlockSum (which adds two blocks and returns both a carry bit and a 32-bit sum), addBlock (which
is derived from the former one by dropping the carry bit), addBlockHalf and addBlockHalves (which are
similar to the former one but take half-word arguments that are converted to blocks before summation);
the other non-constructors are auxiliary functions implementing a 32-bit adder built using four 8-bit
adders.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type BlockSum = {x: Bit , w: Block};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addBlockSum (w1, w2 : Block) returns (ws: BlockSum)
var os , os1 , os2 , os3: OctetSum;
let
os = addOctetSum (w1.o4 , w2.o4 , X0);
os1 = addOctetSum (w1.o3 , w2.o3 , os.x);
os2 = addOctetSum (w1.o2 , w2.o2 , os1.x);
os3 = addOctetSum (w1.o1 , w2.o1 , os2.x);
ws = {x: os3.x,
w: {o1: os3.o, o2: os2.o, o3: os1.o, o4: os.o}};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function dropCarryBlockSum (ws: BlockSum) returns (w: Block)
w = ws.w;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addBlock (w1, w2 : Block) returns (w: Block)
w = dropCarryBlockSum (addBlockSum (w1, w2));
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addBlockHalf (h1: Half; w1: Block) returns (w: Block)
w = addBlock ({o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: h1.o1, o4: h1.o2}, w1);
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function addBlockHalves (h1, h2: Half) returns (w: Block)
w = addBlock ({o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: h1.o1, o4: h1.o2},
{o1: x00 , o2: x00 , o3: h2.o1, o4: h2.o2});
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
I Definitions for Type Pair
We define 64-bit words (named “pair” according to the MAA terminology) using a constructor buildPair
that takes two blocks and returns a pair. The main function for this type is mulBlock (which takes two
blocks and computes their 64-bit product); using auxiliary functions presented in Section G implement-
ing a 32-bit multiplier built using four 16-bit multipliers defined in Section E.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type Pair = {w1: Block , w2: Block};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function mulBlock (w1, w2: Block) returns (ww: Pair)
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var w11 , w12 , w21 , w22 , w3 , w4 , w5: Block;
let
w11 = mulHalf (HalfU (w1), HalfU (w2));
w12 = mulHalf (HalfU (w1), HalfL (w2));
w21 = mulHalf (HalfL (w1), HalfU (w2));
w22 = mulHalf (HalfL (w1), HalfL (w2));
w3 = addBlockHalf (HalfL (w12),
addBlockHalves (HalfL (w21), HalfU (w22 )));
w4 = addBlockHalf (HalfU (w3), addBlockHalf (HalfL (w11),
addBlockHalves (HalfU (w12), HalfU(w21 ))));
w5 = addBlockHalves (HalfU (w4), HalfU (w11 ));
ww = {w1: {o1: w5.o3 , o2: w5.o4 , o3: w4.o3 , o4: w4.o4},
w2: {o1: w3.o3, o2: w3.o4 , o3: w22.o3 , o4: w22.o4}};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
J Definitions for Type Key
We define a type Key that is intended to represent the 64-bit keys (J, K) used by the MAA. This type has
a constructor buildKey that takes two blocks and returns a key. In [16], keys are represented using the
type Pair, but we prefer introducing a dedicated type to clearly distinguish between keys and, e.g., results
of the multiplication of two blocks.
type Key = {K: Block , J: Block};
K Definitions (1) of MAA-specific Cryptographic Functions
We define a first set of functions to be used for MAA computations, most of which were present in [6]
or have been later introduced in [16].
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CYC (w1: Block) returns (w: Block)
w = {o1: {x1: w1.o1.x2, x2: w1.o1.x3, x3: w1.o1.x4, x4: w1.o1.x5,
x5: w1.o1.x6 , x6: w1.o1.x7 , x7: w1.o1.x8 , x8: w1.o2.x1},
o2: {x1: w1.o2.x2, x2: w1.o2.x3 , x3: w1.o2.x4 , x4: w1.o2.x5 ,
x5: w1.o2.x6, x6: w1.o2.x7 , x7: w1.o2.x8 , x8: w1.o3.x1},
o3: {x1: w1.o3.x2, x2: w1.o3.x3 , x3: w1.o3.x4 , x4: w1.o3.x5 ,
x5: w1.o3.x6, x6: w1.o3.x7 , x7: w1.o3.x8 , x8: w1.o4.x1},
o4: {x1: w1.o4.x2 , x2: w1.o4.x3 , x3: w1.o4.x4 , x4: w1.o4.x5 ,
x5: w1.o4.x6, x6: w1.o4.x7 , x7: w1.o4.x8 , x8: w1.o1.x1}};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function FIX1 (w1: Block) returns (w: Block)
w = andBlock (orBlock (w1 , x02040801), xBFEF7FDF );
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function FIX2 (w1: Block) returns (w: Block)
w = andBlock (orBlock (w1, x00804021), x7DFEFBFF );
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function needAjust (o: Octet) returns (b: bool)
b = ((o = x00) or (o =xFF));
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function adjustCode (o: Octet) returns (x: Bit)
x = if needAjust (o) = true then X1 else X0;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function adjust (o1, o2: Octet) returns (o: Octet)
o = if needAjust (o1) = true then xorOctet (o1, o2) else o1;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function PAT(w1, w2: Block) returns (o: Octet)
o = {x1: adjustCode (w1.o1), x2: adjustCode (w1.o2),
x3: adjustCode (w1.o3), x4: adjustCode (w1.o4),
x5: adjustCode (w2.o1), x6: adjustCode (w2.o2),
x7: adjustCode (w2.o3), x8: adjustCode (w2.o4)};
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function BYT (w1, w2: Block) returns (w, wp: Block)
var opat: Octet;
let
opat = PAT (w1 , w2);
w = {o1: adjust (w1.o1, rightOctet7 (opat)),
o2: adjust (w1.o2 , rightOctet6 (opat)),
o3: adjust (w1.o3 , rightOctet5 (opat)),
o4: adjust (w1.o4 , rightOctet4 (opat ))};
wp = {o1: adjust (w2.o1 , rightOctet3 (opat)),
o2: adjust (w2.o2 , rightOctet2 (opat)),
o3: adjust (w2.o3 , rightOctet1 (opat)),
o4: adjust (w2.o4 , opat )};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function ADDC (w1, w2: Block) returns (ww: Pair)
var ws: BlockSum;
let
ws = addBlockSum (w1 , w2);
ww = if ws.x = X0 then {w1: x00000000 , w2: ws.w}
else {w1: x00000001 , w2: ws.w};
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
L Definitions (2) of MAA-specific Cryptographic Functions
We define a second set of functions, namely the “multiplicative” functions used for MAA computations.
The three principal operations are MUL1, MUL2, and MUL2A.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MUL1 (w1, w2 : Block) returns (w: Block)
var w1w2 , w3w4: Pair;
let
w1w2 = mulBlock (w1 , w2);
w3w4 = ADDC (w1w2.w1 , w1w2.w2);
w = addBlock (w3w4.w2, w3w4.w1);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MUL2 (w1, w2 : Block) returns (w: Block)
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var w1w2 , w3w4 , w5w6: Pair; w3: Block;
let
w1w2 = mulBlock (w1 , w2);
w3w4 = ADDC (w1w2.w1 , w1w2.w1);
w3 = addBlock (w3w4.w2 , addBlock (w3w4.w1 , w3w4.w1));
w5w6 = ADDC (w3 , w1w2.w2);
w = addBlock (w5w6.w2, addBlock (w5w6.w1, w5w6.w1));
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MUL2A (w1, w2 : Block) returns (w: Block)
var w1w2 , w3w4: Pair; w3: Block;
let
w1w2 = mulBlock (w1 , w2);
w3 = addBlock (w1w2.w1 , w1w2.w1);
w3w4 = ADDC (w3 , w1w2.w2);
w = addBlock (w3w4.w2, addBlock (w3w4.w1, w3w4.w1));
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
M Definitions (3) of MAA-specific Cryptographic Functions
We define a third set of auxilary functions used for MAA computations, and the higher-level functions
that implement the MAA algorithm, namely the prelude, the inner loop, and the coda; the two principal
functions are MAA (which computes the signature of a nonsegmented message) and MAC (which splits
a message into 1024-byte segments and computes the overall signature of this message by iterating on
each segment, the 4-byte signature of each segment being prepended to the bytes of the next segment).
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function squareHalf (h: Half) returns (w: Block)
w = mulHalf (h, h);
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function Q (o: Octet) returns (w: Block)
w = squareHalf (addHalf ({o1: x00 , o2: o}, x0001 ));
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function preludeJ (J1 : Block) returns (J12 , J14 , J16 , J18: Block;
J22 , J24 , J26 , J28: Block)
let
J12 = MUL1 (J1 , J1);
J14 = MUL1 (J12 , J12);
J16 = MUL1 (J12 , J14);
J18 = MUL1 (J12 , J16);
J22 = MUL2 (J1 , J1);
J24 = MUL2 (J22 , J22);
J26 = MUL2 (J22 , J24);
J28 = MUL2 (J22 , J26);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function preludeK (K1: Block) returns (K12 , K14 , K15 , K17 , K19: Block;
K22 , K24 , K25 , K27 , K29: Block)
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let
K12 = MUL1 (K1 , K1);
K14 = MUL1 (K12 , K12);
K15 = MUL1 (K1 , K14);
K17 = MUL1 (K12 , K15);
K19 = MUL1 (K12 , K17);
K22 = MUL2 (K1 , K1);
K24 = MUL2 (K22 , K22);
K25 = MUL2 (K1 , K24);
K27 = MUL2 (K22 , K25);
K29 = MUL2 (K22 , K27);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function preludeHJ (J14 , J16 , J18 , J24 , J26 , J28: Block)
returns (H4 , H6 , H8: Block)
let
H4 = xorBlock (J14 , J24);
H6 = xorBlock (J16 , J26);
H8 = xorBlock (J18 , J28);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function preludeHK (K15 , K17 , K19 , K25 , K27 , K29: Block; P : Octet)
returns (H0 , H5 , H7 , H9: Block)
let
H0 = xorBlock (K15 , K25);
H5 = MUL2 (H0 , Q (P));
H7 = xorBlock (K17 , K27);
H9 = xorBlock (K19 , K29);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function prelude (J, K: Block) returns (X, Y, V, W, S, T: Block)
var P: Octet; J1 , J14 , J16 , J18 , J24 , J26 , J28: Block;
K1, K15 , K17 , K25 , K27 , K19 , K29: Block;
H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9: Block;
let
J1, K1 = BYT (J, K);
P = PAT (J, K);
_, J14 , J16 , J18 , _, J24 , J26 , J28 = preludeJ (J1);
_, _, K15 , K17 , K19 , _, _, K25 , K27 , K29 = preludeK (K1);
H4, H6, H8 = preludeHJ (J14 , J16 , J18 , J24 , J26 , J28);
_, H5 , H7 , H9 = preludeHK (K15 , K17 , K19 , K25 , K27 , K29 , P);
X, Y = BYT (H4 , H5);
V, W = BYT (H6 , H7);
S, T = BYT (H8 , H9);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, B: Block) returns (Xp, Yp, Vp: Block)
var E: Block;
let
Vp = CYC (V);
E = xorBlock (Vp,W);
Xp = MUL1 (xorBlock (X, B), FIX1 (addBlock (xorBlock (Y, B), E)));
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Yp = MUL2A (xorBlock (Y, B), FIX2 (addBlock (xorBlock (X, B), E)));
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function mainLoop2 (X0, Y0, V0, W, Z, B: Block)
returns (Xp , Yp , Vp: Block)
var X, V, Y: Block;
let
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, Z);
Xp, Yp, Vp = mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, B);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function coda (X, Y, V, W, S, T: Block) returns (Z: Block)
var X1 , X2 , Y1 , Y2 , V1: Block;
let
X1, Y1, V1 = mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, S);
X2, Y2, _ = mainLoop (X1, Y1, V1, W, T);
Z = xorBlock (X2,Y2);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
node MAC (KJ: Key; Mn: Block; init: bool)
returns (X, Y, V, W, S, T, Z: Block; n: int32)
var X0 , Y0 , V0: Block;
newSegment: bool;
let
n = 0 -> if init then 0 else ((pre n) + 1) mod 256;
newSegment = false -> if pre n = 255 then true else false;
−− i n i t i a l i s a t i o n s
X0, Y0, V0, W, S, T = prelude (KJ.J, KJ.K);
−− m a i n l o o p s
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, Mn) ->
if init then
mainLoop (X0, Y0, V0, W, Mn)
else if newSegment then
−− mode o f o p e r a t i o n s
mainLoop2 (X0, Y0, V0, W, pre Z, Mn)
else mainLoop (pre X, pre Y, pre V, W, Mn);
−− coda
Z = coda (X, Y, V, W, S, T);
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
N Test Vectors (1) for Checking MAA Computations
We define a first set of test vectors for the MAA. The following expressions implement the checks listed
in Tables 1, 2, and 3 of [6] and should all evaluate to true if the MAA functions are correctly implemented.
function CHECK_Table_1_2 () returns (res: bool)
var U, L, Up , Lp , Upp , Lpp: Block;
t_mul1 , t_mul2 , t_mul2A , t_byt , t_pat: bool;
let
−− t h i s f u n c t i o n c h e c k s t h e o f f i c i a l t e s t v e c t o r s g i v e n
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−− i n [ ISO 8 7 3 0 : 1 9 9 0 ] on t h e one hand ,
−− and [ ISO 8731−2:1992] and [ Da v i e s−Clayden −88] on t h e o t h e r hand
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n MUL1 − c f . T a b l e 1 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_mul1 = ((MUL1 (x0000000F , x0000000E) = x000000D2) and
(MUL1 (xFFFFFFF0 , x0000000E) = xFFFFFF2D) and
(MUL1 (xFFFFFFF0 , xFFFFFFF1) = x000000D2 ));
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n MUL2 − c f . T a b l e 1 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_mul2 = ((MUL2 (x0000000F , x0000000E) = x000000D2) and
(MUL2 (xFFFFFFF0 , x0000000E) = xFFFFFF3A) and
(MUL2 (xFFFFFFF0 , xFFFFFFF1) = x000000B6 ));
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n MUL2A − c f . T a b l e 1 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_mul2A = (( MUL2A (x0000000F , x0000000E) = x000000D2) and
(MUL2A (xFFFFFFF0 , x0000000E) = xFFFFFF3A) and
(MUL2A (x7FFFFFF0 , xFFFFFFF1) = x800000C2) and
(MUL2A (xFFFFFFF0 , x7FFFFFF1) = x000000C4 ));
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n BYT − c f . T a b l e 2 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
U, L = BYT (x00000000 , x00000000 );
Up, Lp = BYT (xFFFF00FF , xFFFFFFFF );
Upp , Lpp = BYT (xAB00FFCD , xFFEF0001 );
t_byt = (U = x0103070F) and (L = x1F3F7FFF) and (Up = xFEFC07F0) and
(Lp = xE0C08000) and (Upp = xAB01FCCD) and (Lpp = xF2EF3501 );
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n PAT − c f . T a b l e 2 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_pat = (PAT(x00000000 , x00000000) = xFF) and
(PAT(xFFFF00FF , xFFFFFFFF) = xFF) and
(PAT(xAB00FFCD , xFFEF0001) = x6A);
−−
res = t_mul1 and t_mul2 and t_mul2A and t_byt and t_pat;
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_Table_3 () returns (res: bool)
var U, Up , Upp , L, Lp , Lpp: Block;
J1, J12 , J14 , J16 , J18 , J22 , J24 , J26 , J28: Block;
K1, K12 , K14 , K15 , K17 , K19 , K22 , K24 , K25 , K27 , K29: Block;
H0, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9: Block; P: Octet;





J12 , J14 , J16 , J18 , J22 , J24 , J26 , J28 = preludeJ (J1);
K12 , K14 , K15 , K17 , K19 , K22 , K24 , K25 , K27 , K29 = preludeK (K1);
H4, H6, H8 = preludeHJ (J14 , J16 , J18 , J24 , J26 , J28);
H0, H5, H7, H9 = preludeHK (K15 , K17 , K19 , K25 , K27 , K29 , P);
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r J 1 i v a l u e s − c f . T a b l e 3 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_J1i = (J12 = x00010000) and (J14 = x00000001) and
(J16 = x00010000) and (J18 = x00000001 );
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r J 2 i v a l u e s − c f . T a b l e 3 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_J2i = (J22 = x00010000) and (J24 = x00000002) and
(J26 = x00020000) and (J28 = x00000004 );
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r Hi v a l u e s − c f . T a b l e 3 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_Hi = (H4 = x00000003) and (H6 = x00030000) and (H8 = x00000005 );
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−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r K1i v a l u e s − c f . T a b l e 3 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_K1i = (K12 = x00004000) and (K14 = x10000000) and
(K15 = x00000008) and (K17 = x00020000) and
(K19 = x80000000 );
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r K2i v a l u e s − c f . T a b l e 3 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_K2i = (K22 = x00004000) and (K24 = x10000000) and
(K25 = x00000010) and (K27 = x00040000) and
(K29 = x00000002 );
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r Hi v a l u e s − c f . T a b l e 3 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_Hi2 = (H0 = x00000018) and (Q (P) = x00000004) and
(H5 = x00000060) and (H7 = x00060000) and
(H9 = x80000002 );
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n PAT − c f . T a b l e 3 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
t_PAT = (PAT (H4, H5) = xEE) and (PAT (H6, H7) = xBB)
and (PAT (H8 , H9) = xE6);
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n BYT − l o g i c a l l y i n f e r r e d f r o m T a b l e 3
U, L = BYT (H4 , H5);
Up, Lp = BYT (H6, H7);
Upp , Lpp = BYT (H8 , H9);
t_byt = (U = x01030703) and (L = x1D3B7760) and (Up = x0103050B)
and (Lp = x17065DBB) and (Upp = x01030705) and
(Lpp = x80397302 );
−−
res = t_J1i and t_J2i and t_Hi and t_K1i and t_K2i
and t_K2i and t_Hi2 and t_PAT and t_byt;
tel;
O Test Vectors (2) for Checking MAA Computations
We define a second set of test vectors for the MAA, based upon Table 4 of [6]. The following expressions
implement six groups of checks (three single-block messages and one three-block message). They should
all evaluate to true if the main loop of MAA (as described page 10 of [6]) is correctly implemented.
function CHECK_Table_4_m1 () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V, Vp: Block;
W, X0, X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Z: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n Main Loop ( T a b l e 4 o f [ ISO 8731 −2:1992] )
−− f i r s t s i n g l e −B l o c k m e s s a g e
−− i n p u t v a l u e s g i v e n i n T a b l e 4
A = x00000004; −− f a k e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00000001; −− f a k e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xFFFFFFF7; −− f a k e ”C” c o n s t a n t






−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d page 10 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
Vp = CYC (V);
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E = xorBlock (Vp, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
Z = xorBlock (Xp, Yp);
−−
res = (Vp = x00000006) and (E = x00000005) and
(X = x00000007) and (Y = x00000006) and
(F = x0000000B) and (G = x0000000C) and
(Fp = x0000000F) and (Gp = x0000000D) and
(Fpp = x00000007) and (Gpp = x00000009) and
(Xp = x00000031) and (Yp = x00000036) and
(Z = x00000007 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_Table_4_m2 () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V, Vp: Block;
W, X0 , X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Z: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n Main Loop ( T a b l e 4 o f [ ISO 8731 −2:1992] )
−− s e c o n d s i n g l e −B l o c k m e s s a g e
−− i n p u t v a l u e s g i v e n i n T a b l e 4
A = x00000001; −− f a k e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00000004; −− f a k e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xFFFFFFF9; −− f a k e ”C” c o n s t a n t






−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d page 10 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
Vp = CYC (V);
E = xorBlock (Vp, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
Z = xorBlock (Xp, Yp);
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−−
res = (Vp = x00000006) and (E = x00000005) and (X = xFFFFFFFC)
and (Y = xFFFFFFFD) and (F = x00000002) and (G = x00000001)
and (Fp = x00000003) and (Gp = x00000005) and (Fpp = x00000001)
and (Gpp = x00000004) and (Xp = xFFFFFFFC) and (Yp = xFFFFFFFA)
and (Z = x00000006 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_Table_4_m3 () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V, Vp: Block;
W, X0 , X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Z: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r f u n c t i o n Main Loop ( T a b l e 4 o f [ ISO 8731 −2:1992] )
−− t h i r d s i n g l e −B l o c k m e s s a g e
−− i n p u t v a l u e s g i v e n i n T a b l e 4
A = x00000001; −− f a k e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00000002; −− f a k e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xFFFFFFFE; −− f a k e ”C” c o n s t a n t






−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d page 10 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
Vp = CYC (V);
E = xorBlock (Vp, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
Z = xorBlock (Xp, Yp);
−−
res = (Vp = x0000000E) and (E = x00000009) and (X = xFFFFFFF5)
and (Y = xFFFFFFF4) and (F = xFFFFFFFD) and (G = xFFFFFFFE)
and (Fp = xFFFFFFFD) and (Gp = xFFFFFFFE) and (Fpp = xFFFFFFFC)
and (Gpp = x7FFFFFFC) and (Xp = x0000001E) and (Yp = x0000001E)
and (Z = x00000000 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_3_messages_m1 () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V, Vp: Block;
W, X0 , X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Z: Block;
let
−− t h r e e −B l o c k m e s s a g e : f i r s t B l o c k
−− i n p u t v a l u e s g i v e n i n T a b l e 4
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A = x00000002; −− f a k e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00000001; −− f a k e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xFFFFFFFB; −− f a k e ”C” c o n s t a n t






−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d page 10 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
Vp = CYC (V);
E = xorBlock (Vp, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
Z = xorBlock (Xp, Yp);
−−
res = (Vp = x00000002) and (E = x00000003) and (X = x00000001)
and (Y = x00000002) and (F = x00000005) and (G = x00000004)
and (Fp = x00000007) and (Gp = x00000005) and (Fpp = x00000003)
and (Gpp = x00000001) and (Xp = x00000003) and (Yp = x00000002)
and (Z = x00000001 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_3_messages_m2 () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V, Vp: Block;
W, X0 , X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Z: Block;
let
−− t h r e e −B l o c k m e s s a g e : s e c o n d B l o c k
−− i n p u t v a l u e s g i v e n i n T a b l e 4
A = x00000002; −− f a k e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00000001; −− f a k e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xFFFFFFFB; −− f a k e ”C” c o n s t a n t






−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d page 10 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
Vp = CYC (V);
E = xorBlock (Vp, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
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G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
Z = xorBlock (Xp, Yp);
−−
res = (Vp = x00000004) and (E = x00000005) and (X = x00000002)
and (Y = x00000003) and (F = x00000008) and (G = x00000007)
and (Fp = x0000000A) and (Gp = x00000007) and (Fpp = x0000000A)
and (Gpp = x00000003) and (Xp = x00000014) and (Yp = x00000009)
and (Z = x0000001D );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_3_messages_m3 () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V, Vp: Block;
W, X0 , X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Z: Block;
let
−− t h r e e −B l o c k m e s s a g e : t h i r d B l o c k
−− i n p u t v a l u e s g i v e n i n T a b l e 4
A = x00000002; −− f a k e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00000001; −− f a k e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xFFFFFFFB; −− f a k e ”C” c o n s t a n t






−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d page 10 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
Vp = CYC (V);
E = xorBlock (Vp, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
Z = xorBlock (Xp, Yp);
−−
res = (Vp = x00000008) and (E = x00000009) and (X = x00000016)
and (Y = x0000000B) and (F = x00000014) and (G = x0000001F)
and (Fp = x00000016) and (Gp = x0000001F) and (Fpp = x00000012)
and (Gpp = x0000001B) and (Xp = x0000018C) and (Yp = x00000129)
and (Z = x000000A5 );
tel;
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_Annex_E () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V0 , V: Block;
W, X0 , X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s o f Annex E . 3 . 3 o f [ ISO 8 7 3 0 : 1 9 9 0 ]
A = x02040801; −− t r u e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00804021; −− t r u e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xBFEF7FDF; −− t r u e ”C” c o n s t a n t






−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n on t h e f i r s t B l o c k M
V = CYC (V0);
E = xorBlock (V, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
−−
res = (V = x89D635D7) and (E = x7F76A3B0) and (X = x2BF8499A)
and (Y = x7DB2D9F4) and (F = xFD297DA4) and (G = xAB6EED4A)
and (Fp = xFF2D7DA5) and (Gp = xABEEED6B) and (Fpp = xBF2D7D85)
and (Gpp = x29EEE96B) and (Xp = x0AD67E20) and (Yp = x30261492 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
We complete the above tests with additional test vectors taken from [12, Annex E.3.3], which only gives
detailed values for the first block of the 84-block test message.
function CHECK_Annex_E () returns (res: bool)
var A, B, C, D, E, F, Fp , Fpp , G, Gp , Gpp , M, V0 , V: Block;
W, X0 , X, Xp , Y0 , Y, Yp: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s o f Annex E . 3 . 3 o f [ ISO 8 7 3 0 : 1 9 9 0 ]
A = x02040801; −− t r u e ”A” c o n s t a n t
B = x00804021; −− t r u e ”B” c o n s t a n t
C = xBFEF7FDF; −− t r u e ”C” c o n s t a n t







−− l o o p i t e r a t i o n on t h e f i r s t B l o c k M
V = CYC (V0);
E = xorBlock (V, W);
X = xorBlock (X0, M);
Y = xorBlock (Y0, M);
F = addBlock (E, Y);
G = addBlock (E, X);
Fp = orBlock (F, A);
Gp = orBlock (G, B);
Fpp = andBlock (Fp , C);
Gpp = andBlock (Gp , D);
Xp = MUL1 (X, Fpp);
Yp = MUL2A (Y, Gpp);
−−
res = (V = x89D635D7) and (E = x7F76A3B0) and (X = x2BF8499A)
and (Y = x7DB2D9F4) and (F = xFD297DA4) and (G = xAB6EED4A)
and (Fp = xFF2D7DA5) and (Gp = xABEEED6B) and (Fpp = xBF2D7D85)
and (Gpp = x29EEE96B) and (Xp = x0AD67E20) and (Yp = x30261492 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
P Test vectors (3) for Checking MAA Computations
We define a third set of test vectors for the MAA, based upon Table 5 of [6]. The following expressions
implement four groups of checks, with two different keys and two different messages. They should all
evaluate to true if the MAA signature is correctly computed.
function CHECK_Table_5_v1 () returns (res: bool)
var J, K, X0 , X, Xp , Xpp , Xppp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Ypp , Yppp: Block;
V0, V, Vp, Vpp , W, S, T, Z, M1, M2: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r t h e w h o l e a l g o r i t h m ( T a b l e 5 o f [ ISO 8731 −2:1992] )





X0, Y0, V0, W, S, T = prelude (J, K);
−− 1 s t MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, M1);
−− 2 nd MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
Xp, Yp, Vp = mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, M2);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h S
Xpp , Ypp , Vpp = mainLoop (Xp , Yp , Vp , W, S);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h T
Xppp , Yppp , _ = mainLoop (Xpp , Ypp , Vpp , W, T);
Z = xorBlock (Xppp ,Yppp);
−−
res = (PAT (J, K) = xFF) and (X0 = x4A645A01) and (Y0 = x50DEC930) and
(V0 = x5CCA3239) and (W = xFECCAA6E) and (S = x51EDE9C7) and
(T = x24B66FB5) and (X = x48B204D6) and (Y = x5834A585) and
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(Xp = x4F998E01) and (Yp = xBE9F0917) and (Ypp = xDB9102B0) and
(Xpp = x344925FC) and (Xppp = x277B4B25) and (Yppp = xD636250D)
and (Z = xF14D6E28 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_Table_5_v2 () returns (res: bool)
var J, K, X0 , X, Xp , Xpp , Xppp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Ypp , Yppp: Block;
V0, V, Vp, Vpp , W, S, T, Z, M1, M2: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r t h e w h o l e a l g o r i t h m ( T a b l e 5 o f [ ISO 8731 −2:1992] )





X0, Y0, V0, W, S, T = prelude (J, K);
−− 1 s t MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, M1);
−− 2 nd MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
Xp, Yp, Vp = mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, M2);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h S
Xpp , Ypp , Vpp = mainLoop (Xp , Yp , Vp , W, S);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h T
Xppp , Yppp , _ = mainLoop (Xpp , Ypp , Vpp , W, T);
Z = xorBlock (Xppp ,Yppp);
−−
res = (PAT (J, K) = xFF) and (X0 = x4A645A01) and (Y0 = x50DEC930)
and (V0 = x5CCA3239) and (W = xFECCAA6E) and (S = x51EDE9C7)
and (T = x24B66FB5) and (X = x6AEBACF8) and (Y = x9DB15CF6)
and (Xp = x270EEDAF) and (Yp = xB8142629) and (Xpp = x29907CD8)
and (Ypp = xBA92DB12) and (Xppp = x28EAD8B3) and
(Yppp = x81D10CA3) and (Z = xA93BD410 );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_Table_5_v3 () returns (res: bool)
var J, K, X0 , X, Xp , Xpp , Xppp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Ypp , Yppp: Block;
V0, V, Vp, Vpp , W, S, T, Z, M1, M2: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r t h e w h o l e a l g o r i t h m ( T a b l e 5 o f [ ISO 8731 −2:1992] )





X0, Y0, V0, W, S, T = prelude (J, K);
−− 1 s t MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, M1);
−− 2 nd MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
Xp, Yp, Vp = mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, M2);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h S
Xpp , Ypp , Vpp = mainLoop (Xp , Yp , Vp , W, S);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h T
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Xppp , Yppp , _ = mainLoop (Xpp , Ypp , Vpp , W, T);
Z = xorBlock (Xppp ,Yppp);
−−
res = (PAT (J, K) = x00) and (X0 = x34ACF886) and (Y0 = x7397C9AE) and
(V0 = x7201F4DC) and (W = x2829040B) and (S = x9E2E7B36) and
(T = x13647149) and (X = x2FD76FFB) and (Y = x550D91CE) and
(Xp = xA70FC148) and (Yp = x1D10D8D3) and (Xpp = xB1CC1CC5)
and (Ypp = x29C1485F) and (Xppp = x288FC786) and
(Yppp = x9115A558) and (Z = xB99A62DE );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK_Table_5_v4 () returns (res: bool)
var J, K, X0 , X, Xp , Xpp , Xppp , Y0 , Y, Yp , Ypp , Yppp: Block;
V0, V, Vp, Vpp , W, S, T, Z, M1, M2: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r t h e w h o l e a l g o r i t h m ( T a b l e 5 o f [ ISO 8731 −2:1992] )





X0, Y0, V0, W, S, T = prelude (J, K);
−− 1 s t MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, M1);
−− 2 nd MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
Xp, Yp, Vp = mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, M2);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h S
Xpp , Ypp , Vpp = mainLoop (Xp , Yp , Vp , W, S);
Xppp , Yppp , _ = mainLoop (Xpp , Ypp , Vpp , W, T);
Z = xorBlock (Xppp ,Yppp);
−−
res = (PAT (J, K) = x00) and (X0 = x34ACF886) and (Y0 = x7397C9AE) and
(V0 = x7201F4DC) and (W = x2829040B) and (S = x9E2E7B36) and
(T = x13647149) and (X = x8DC8BBDE) and (Y = xFE4E5BDD) and
(Xp = xCBC865BA) and (Yp = x0297AF6F) and (Xpp = x3CF3A7D2) and
(Ypp = x160EE9B5) and (Xppp = xD0482465) and (Yppp = x7050EC5E)
and (Z = xA018C83B );
tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
We complete the above tests with additional test vectors taken from from [12, Annex E.3.3], which gives
prelude results computed for another key.
function CHECK_PRELUDE_Annex_E33 () returns (res: bool)
var J, K, X, Y, V, W, S, T: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s o f Annex E . 3 . 3 o f [ ISO 8 7 3 0 : 1 9 9 0 ]
J = xE6A12F07;
K = x9D15C437;
X, Y, V, W, S, T = prelude (J, K);
−−
res = (X = x21D869BA) and (Y = x7792F9D4) and (V = xC4EB1AEB) and
(W = xF6A09667) and (S = x6D67E884) and (T = xA511987A );
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tel;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Q Test Vectors (4) for Checking MAA Computations
We define a last set of test vectors for the MAA. The first one (a message of 20 blocks containing only
zeros) was directly taken from Table 6 of [6].
function CHECK_ALL_ALGO_20m () returns (res: bool)
var B, J, K, X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, S, T: Block; tp: bool;
X, X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 , X5 , X6 , X7 , X8 , X9 , X10 , X11: Block;
X12 , X13 , X14 , X15 , X16 , X17 , X18 , X19 , X20 , X21: Block;
Y, Y1 , Y2 , Y3 , Y4 , Y5 , Y6 , Y7 , Y8 , Y9 , Y10 , Y11: Block;
Y12 , Y13 , Y14 , Y15 , Y16 , Y17 , Y18 , Y19 , Y20 , Y21: Block;
V, V1 , V2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , V6 , V7 , V8 , V9 , V10 , V11: Block;
V12 , V13 , V14 , V15 , V16 , V17 , V18 , V19 , V20: Block;
let
−− t e s t v e c t o r s f o r t h e w h o l e a l g o r i t h m
J = x80018001;
K = x80018000;
−− t e s t m e n t i o n e d i n T a b l e 6 o f [ ISO 8731−2:1992]
−− i t e r a t i o n s on a m e s s a g e c o n t a i n g 20 n u l l B l o c k s
X0, Y0, V0, W, S, T = prelude (J, K);
B = x00000000;
−− 1 s t MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X, Y, V = mainLoop (X0 , Y0 , V0 , W, B);
−− 2 nd MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X1, Y1, V1 = mainLoop (X, Y, V, W, B);
−− 3 rd MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X2, Y2, V2 = mainLoop (X1, Y1, V1, W, B);
−− 4 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X3, Y3, V3 = mainLoop (X2, Y2, V2, W, B);
−− 5 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X4, Y4, V4 = mainLoop (X3, Y3, V3, W, B);
−− 6 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X5, Y5, V5 = mainLoop (X4, Y4, V4, W, B);
−− 7 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X6, Y6, V6 = mainLoop (X5, Y5, V5, W, B);
−− 8 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X7, Y7, V7 = mainLoop (X6, Y6, V6, W, B);
−− 9 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X8, Y8, V8 = mainLoop (X7, Y7, V7, W, B);
−− 10 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X9, Y9, V9 = mainLoop (X8, Y8, V8, W, B);
−− 11 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X10 , Y10 , V10 = mainLoop (X9 , Y9 , V9 , W, B);
−− 12 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X11 , Y11 , V11 = mainLoop (X10 , Y10 , V10 , W, B);
−− 13 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X12 , Y12 , V12 = mainLoop (X11 , Y11 , V11 , W, B);
−− 14 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
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X13 , Y13 , V13 = mainLoop (X12 , Y12 , V12 , W, B);
−− 15 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X14 , Y14 , V14 = mainLoop (X13 , Y13 , V13 , W, B);
−− 16 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X15 , Y15 , V15 = mainLoop (X14 , Y14 , V14 , W, B);
−− 17 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X16 , Y16 , V16 = mainLoop (X15 , Y15 , V15 , W, B);
−− 18 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X17 , Y17 , V17 = mainLoop (X16 , Y16 , V16 , W, B);
−− 19 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X18 , Y18 , V18 = mainLoop (X17 , Y17 , V17 , W, B);
−− 20 t h MainLoop i t e r a t i o n
X19 , Y19 , V19 = mainLoop (X18 , Y18 , V18 , W, B);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h S
X20 , Y20 , V20 = mainLoop (X19 , Y19 , V19 , W, S);
−− Coda : MainLoop i t e r a t i o n w i t h T
X21 , Y21 , _ = mainLoop (X20 , Y20 , V20 , W, T);
−−
tp = (X = x303FF4AA) and (Y = x1277A6D4) and (X1 = x55DD063F) and
(Y1 = x4C49AAE0) and (X2 = x51AF3C1D) and (Y2 = x5BC02502) and
(X3 = xA44AAAC0) and (Y3 = x63C70DBA) and (X4 = x4D53901A) and
(Y4 = x2E80AC30) and (X5 = x5F38EEF1) and (Y5 = x2A6091AE) and
(X6 = xF0239DD5) and (Y6 = x3DD81AC6) and (X7 = xEB35B97F) and
(Y7 = x9372CDC6) and (X8 = x4DA124A1) and (Y8 = xC6B1317E) and
(X9 = x7F839576) and (Y9 = x74B39176) and (X10 = x11A9D254) and
(Y10 = xD78634BC) and (X11 = xD8804CA5) and (Y11 = xFDC1A8BA) and
(X12 = x3F6F7248) and (Y12 = x11AC46B8) and (X13 = xACBC13DD) and
(Y13 = x33D5A466) and (X14 = x4CE933E1) and (Y14 = xC21A1846) and
(X15 = xC1ED90DD) and (Y15 = xCD959B46) and (X16 = x3CD54DEB) and
(Y16 = x613F8E2A) and (X17 = xBBA57835) and (Y17 = x07C72EAA) and
(X18 = xD7843FDC) and (Y18 = x6AD6E8A4) and (X19 = x5EBA06C2) and
(Y19 = x91896CFA) and (X20 = x1D9C9655) and (Y20 = x98D1CC75) and
(X21 = x7BC180AB) and (Y21 = xA0B87B77 );
res = tp and (coda (X19 , Y19 , V19 , W, S, T) = xDB79FBDC );
tel;
